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THIS WE’LL DEFEND: EXPANDING UCMJ ARTICLE 2 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AS A RESPONSE TO 




In March 2017, it was revealed that current and former armed service 
members shared thousands of nude photos of their female counterparts over social 
media. Although some of these photos were taken with the women’s consent, almost 
none of them were distributed with the women’s consent.
Victims have little legal recourse. Military law is silent on the matter of 
nonconsensual distribution. Federal civilian law speaks only to interstate 
stalking, domestic violence, and harassment, while only thirty-four states have 
revenge porn laws that sufficiently criminalize nonconsensual distribution of 
illicit photographs. Further complicating matters, the perpetrator’s military status 
as active duty, reservist, or National Guardsman at the time of the crime 
determines which remaining punitive remedies are available to the victim, if any.
Under the current legal framework, two recent developments in U.S. military 
policy risk opening female service members to additional exposure. First, in 2015, 
the Department of Defense opened all combat roles to women. Second, and 
concurrently, the Department began downscaling the military to a smaller, more 
flexible force increasingly supplemented by its reserve and National Guard (non 
active-duty) forces. In light of these developments, the current state of the law poses 
an unacceptable risk that the growing number of female service members will be 
subjected to the dual horrors of seeing lewd photos of themselves plastered across the 
internet, and of seeing the perpetrator walk freely. This Note argues for expanding
Article 2 subject matter jurisdiction of the Uniform Code of Military Justice to 
include all currently contracted members of the U.S. military—active duty, 
reservist, and guard—in order to bring peace of mind to those female service 
members willing to fight for peace abroad.
* J.D., December 2018, University of Michigan Law School. I would like to thank the 
staff of the Michigan Journal of Law Reform for their hard work and patience in getting this 
piece printer-worthy. Behind every article is an army of Associate Editors, Contributing Edi-
tors, and Executive Editors, and they deserve the lion’s share of credit for this article. I 
would also like to thank the Honorable Theresa J. Canepa for reading my first draft, Juliet 
Bennett for reading my second draft, and Ross MacPherson for reading my third draft. But 
most of all, I would like to thank the members of our armed forces. As a civilian, it’s easy for
me to sit behind a computer and write an article about how to make the world a better 
place. You actually go out and do it.
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INTRODUCTION
“Hundreds of Marines Investigated for Sharing Photos of Naked 
Colleagues.” This was the headline published by The War Horse, a 
non-profit news organization headed by Marine Veteran Thomas 
Brennan, in March 2017.1 At first, the nonconsensual sharing of 
nude photos over social media appeared to be an isolated instance 
of misconduct by some bad-apple Marines: disrespectful, shameful, 
and immoral, but surely not indicative of any large-scale maltreat-
ment of female service members by their male counterparts. The 
ensuing investigations proved otherwise, though. Within a matter 
of days, the sharing of nude photos of female service members was 
revealed to be far more than merely isolated misconduct. The 
nonconsensual distribution of illicit photographs is a cancer that 
not only implicates the military’s foundational values of camarade-
rie and honor, but also sheds light on the need to change how the 
armed forces holds its members accountable to the law; specifical-
ly, by reforming the subject matter jurisdiction of Article 2 of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to cover particular con-
duct of reservists and National Guardsmen.
This Note contains three parts. Part I discusses the events which 
brought the need for reform to the fore, considers longstanding 
statutory roadblocks to reform and explores how courts and critics 
have historically navigated them, and explains why current devel-
opments in national military policy have made conditions ripe for 
1. Thomas Brennan, Hundreds of Marines Investigated for Sharing Photos of Naked Col-
leagues, REVEAL (Mar. 4, 2017), https://www.revealnews.org/blog/hundreds-of-marines-
investigated-for-sharing-photos-of-naked-colleagues; see also Leo Shane III & Jeff Schogol, 
Prosecuting Marines Over Nude Photo Scandal Could be Difficult, MILITARY TIMES (Mar. 10, 2017), 
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2017/03/10/prosecuting-
marines-over-nude-photo-scandal-could-be-difficult/.
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reform. Part II addresses the current status of military, federal, and 
state law as they specifically apply to nonconsensual distribution of 
illicit photographs. Part III offers two proposed solutions to the 
problem: one from the judicial perspective and one from the legis-
lative perspective. This Note concludes by emphasizing that these 
solutions are not the best—or only—options; they are merely a 
starting point.
I. THE ROAD TO REFORM
A. The Scandal
In January 2017, Brennan reported to Marine Corps leadership 
that lewd photos of female Marines were being shared by current 
and former Marines over a private Facebook group entitled “Ma-
rines United.”2 At the time of reporting, the group boasted over 
30,000 members—all male.3 Initially organized as a suicide preven-
tion and support network for veterans, the group later shifted its 
focus to facilitating acts of revenge porn.4 What started as a trickle 
turned into a tidal wave, as nude photos of female Marines flooded 
the “Marines United” Facebook page.5
The page became a wellspring of salacious content, which soon 
spilled over. Hundreds—if not thousands—of photographs were 
uploaded to an external folder and then shared for members to 
access with ease.6
Occasionally, bounties were offered for nude pictures of specific 
female Marines.7  These women were identified by their full name, 
rank, and military duty station.8 In some cases, the photographs 
were taken with the victim’s knowledge and consent; in likely many 
2. Andrea Gonzales-Ramirez, The Navy & The Marines Have Made Revenge Porn Illegal—
Here’s Why, REFINERY29 (May 12, 2017), http://www.refinery29.com/2017/04/150816/navy-
marines-revenge-porn-scandal-explained; see also Elliot McLaughlin & AnneClaire Stapleton, 
Secret Marines Group is Still Sharing Nude Photos Amid Scandal, CNN (Mar. 9, 2017), http://
www.cnn.com/2017/03/08/politics/marines-united-photos-investigation/index.html.
3. Gonzalez-Ramirez, supra note 2.
4. Jared Keller, The Rise And Fall (And Rise) Of ‘Marines United,’ TASK AND PURPOSE
(Mar. 16, 2017), https://taskandpurpose.com/rise-fall-rise-marines-united.
5. Elliot Ackerman, Inside the Nude Photo Scandal that Rocked the Marine Corps, ESQUIRE 
(July 10, 2017), http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a55981/marines-nude-photo-
scandal/.
6. Id.
7. Jack Murphy, Marines United 2: A Scandal Rebooted, SOFREP (Mar. 9, 2017), https://
sofrep.com/76668/marines-united-2-a-scandal-rebooted/.
8. Gonzales-Ramirez, supra note 2.
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more cases, they were distributed without the victim’s knowledge 
and consent.9
Brennan’s January 2017 report forced the “Marines United” Fa-
cebook page to be shut down.10 Nonconsensual distribution of na-
ked photos of female service members, however, was not unique to 
current and former Marines. Investigations following the “Marines 
United” 1.0 scandal revealed activity of military personnel on the 
website titled “Anon-IB”.11 There, it was discovered that scores of 
male service members from all branches of the military shared and 
exchanged comments about nude photos of female service mem-
bers.12
The revelation of widespread misconduct shocked military lead-
ership. It also caused severe headaches for those tasked with han-
dling the situation. At the time the “Marines United” scandal
broke, the UCMJ made it clear that any service member who 
“knowingly photographs, videotapes, films, or records by any 
means the private area of another person, without that other per-
son’s consent” has committed a crime.13 Two issues quickly 
emerged: first, stealing private photos and sharing them online was 
not specified as a crime under either military or federal law. This 
loophole prompted the House to pass legislation to make the non-
consensual distribution of illicit photos a crime both under the 
UCMJ and federal law.14 The second issue confronting military 
leaders has not yet been addressed: a large number of individuals 
sharing the nude photos were either reservists or National 
Guardsmen. The subject matter jurisdiction of the UCMJ, however,
only reaches the actions of Reserve and National Guard service 
members under limited circumstances.
9. Ackerman, supra note 5.
10. Paula Mooney, MU2.0: Facebook Group Photos Now in Pornhub, Dropbox Videos,
INQUISITR (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.inquisitr.com/4047059/mu2-0-marines-united-2-0-
facebook-group-photos-now-in-pornhub-dropbox-videos/.
11. David Martin, Marines Nude Photo Scandal Expands to All Branches of Military, CBS 
NEWS (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/marines-nude-photo-scandal-
expands-to-military-wide-explicit-message-board/.
12. Id.
13. Shane III & Schogol, supra note 1.
14. Michael Macagnone, House Passes Bill Targeting Marine Nude Photo Scandal, LAW360
(May 24, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/ 927241/house-passes-bill-targeting-
marine-nude-photo-scandal.
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B. The Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Subject matter jurisdiction over service members in the Reserve 
components and the National Guard is governed by the UCMJ 
(concurrent with the U.S. Code and common law).
Article 2 of the UCMJ (10 U.S.C. § 802) defines who falls under 
the purview of the UCMJ. In relevant portion, it states:
(a) The following persons are subject to this chap-
ter: . . .(3) Members of a reserve component while on inac-
tive-duty training, but in the case of the Army National 
Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of 
the United States only when in Federal service. . .15
Under Article 2(a)(3), members of a reserve component are sub-
ject to the UCMJ during inactive duty training.16 Meanwhile, mem-
bers of the National Guard are subject to the UCMJ only when 
called to federal service. The difference between “inactive duty”
and “federal service” is significant. While members of reserve com-
ponents fall exclusively under the control of the federal govern-
ment, members of the National Guard serve both the state and 
federal governments. So, while members of reserve components 
answer to the UCMJ whenever they engage in any military-related 
obligation, members of the National Guard may not answer to the 
UCMJ under identical conditions. It is therefore necessary to lo-
cate exactly when a member of the National Guard is called to fed-
eral service for purposes of Article 2 of the UCMJ. In order to 
make this determination, we look to Title 10 and Title 32 of the 
U.S. Code.
1.  The Statutes
Title 10 allows the president to activate members of reserve 
components and to federalize National Guard forces.17 This means 
that under Title 10, members of both reserve components and Na-
tional Guard are considered to have active duty status.18 As defined 
15. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a) (2018).
16. Robert E. Reed, Procedures and Issues Relating to the Court-Martial of Reservists, 32 A.F. 
L. REV. 331, 332 (1990).Prior to 1986, the UCMJ applied to reservists only while serving on 
active duty. Id.
17. See NAT’L GUARD ASS’N, NGAUS FACT SHEET 3 (May 3, 2006), http://
www.nationalguard.mil/About-the-Guard/Army-National-Guard/Resources/News/ARNG-
Media/FileId/137011/.
18. See 10 U.S.C. § 12406 (2018); 10 U.S.C. § 12301 (2018).
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by Title 10, active duty status “means full-time duty in the active 
military service of the United States. Such term includes full-time 
training duty, annual training duty, and attendance, while in the 
active military service, at a school designated as a service 
school. . . .”19 Confusingly, active duty in this context does not 
mean the same thing as “full-time National Guard duty.”20 Instead, 
as defined by Title 10, National Guard members are only consid-
ered on active duty status pursuant to section 12301(d) of the same 
Title, or section 502(f) of Title 32, if they are also performing Ac-
tive Guard and Reserve duty.21
Title 32, on the other hand, allows the governor, “with the ap-
proval of the President . . . to order a [National Guard] member to 
duty for operational Homeland Defense activities . . . .”22 In this 
capacity, members of the National Guard are placed in full-time 
duty status under the control of their State while being federally 
funded.23 This raises the question of whether members of the Na-
tional Guard can be considered federalized under Title 32—even if 
they are not serving on active duty as defined by Title 10. That pos-
sibility was previously foreclosed by the U.S. Supreme Court, find-
ing that members of the National Guard can “never” be considered 
federalized.24 Recent developments in the case law, however, cast 
doubt on whether that interpretation of Title 32 remains a hard-
and-fast rule.25
19. Id. § 101(d)(1).
20. Id. (“The term ‘full-time National Guard duty’ means training or other duty, other 
than inactive duty, performed by a member of the Army National Guard of the United 
States or the Air National Guard of the United States in the member’s status as a member of 
the National Guard of a State or territory, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District 
of Columbia . . . .”).
21. Id. §101(b)(16) (“ ‘[A]ctive Guard and Reserve Duty’ means active duty performed 
by a member of a reserve component. . .or full-time National Guard duty performed by a 
member of the National Guard pursuant to an order to full-time National Guard duty, for a 
period of 180 consecutive days or more . . . .”).
22. NGAUS FACT SHEET, supra note 17 (“The term ‘Homeland Defense activity’ means 
an activity undertaken for the military protection of the territory or domestic population of 
the U.S. . . . or other asset of the U.S. determined by the Secretary of Defense as being criti-
cal to national security . . . .”) (quoting 32 U.S.C. § 901 (2006)).
23. Id.
24. James P. Pottorff, Jr., Solorio v. United States: The Supreme Court Reverses Direction on 
Jurisdiction over Military Offenders in Civilian Communities, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Oct. 1988, at 29, 
31–32 (“National Guard soldiers and airmen are not subject to the UCMJ when they are per-
forming duties in state service under title 32, United States Code. Typically, National Guard 
training is conducted in state service under title 32, and not in federal service under title 10. 
The controlling factor is the authority listed on the orders directing individual training.”).
25. See T. Scott Randall, Application of Article 2(c) of the UCMJ to Title 32 Soldiers, 2013
ARMY LAW. 29, 31.
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2.  Randall and the Sister Cases (Phillips and Fry)
The most relevant cases to this analysis are United States v. Phillips 
and United States v. Fry. In Phillips, an Air Force reservist was grant-
ed one-day travel-time to drive to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base 
in Ohio.26 Over the course of that one day trip, the reservist con-
sumed marijuana, for which she tested positive the following 
week.27 The court applied Article 2’s four-part test to determine 
that Phillips—a reservist—was on active duty and thus eligible for 
court-martial, finding that she was a “person serving with an armed 
force who: (1) submit[ted] voluntarily to military authority, (2) 
me[t] the minimum competency and age standards, (3) receive[d] 
military pay or allowances, and (4) perform[ed] military du-
ties . . . .”28
In Fry, a Marine appealed from a conviction by court-martial of 
being absent without leave, possessing child pornography, and 
fraudulently enlisting.29 The Marine argued that because he was 
subject to a limited conservatorship at the time of enlistment, his 
subsequent enlistment in the Marine Corps was void.30 Despite this, 
the court found that it had jurisdiction over the case under Article 
2(c) of the UCMJ.31 Here, the court looked at the opening clause 
of Article 2(c), “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,”32
and found the language indicative of congressional intent to 
preempt or supersede all state or federal law regarding this partic-
ular provision.33
T. Scott Randall explores the possible ramifications of both Phil-
lips and Fry in his article, “Application of Article 2(c) of the UCMJ 
to Title 32 soldiers.” Here, Randall uses the hypothetical of a Title 
32 duty Texas National Guardsman who commits an act of disre-
spect towards a Title 10 officer to show how Article 2 may still apply 
in a Title 32 setting.
Randall first lays out the basic legal framework, being that Title 
32 Texas military forces are subject to the Texas Code of Military 
Justice (TCMJ), rather than the UCMJ.34 And because the TCMJ 
strictly limits offenses to those involving Texas military forces, the 
offense of disrespect toward a superior commissioned officer un-
26. United States v. Phillips, 56 M.J. 843, 844–45 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2002), aff’d, 58 
M.J. 217 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
27. Id. at 845.
28. Id. at 846.
29. United States v. Fry, 70 M.J. 465, 467 (C.A.A.F. 2012).
30. See id. at 468.
31. Id. at 472.
32. Id. at 468–69.
33. Id. at 469.
34. See Randall, supra note 25, at 29.
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der the TCMJ applies only to those cases where both the inferior 
and superior officers are members of the Texas National Guard. 
“Therefore,” Randall explains, a “Texas National Guard Officer 
serving . . . in a Title 32 status cannot be charged with disrespect 
towards a superior commissioned officer under the TCMJ for con-
duct towards a superior Title 10 officer.”35 Nor does the UCMJ ap-
pear to solve the problem; UCMJ jurisdiction does not typically at-
tach to soldiers serving under Title 32.36
The problem confronted by Randall parallels the problem at is-
sue in this Note: both disrespect to a Title 10 superior officer by a 
Title 32 soldier and non-consensual distribution of illicit photo-
graphs of service members are military offenses, largely non-
cognizable under both federal and state law, providing no appar-
ent legal recourse for the victim. Fortunately—for Randall’s pur-
poses and ours—an answer may lie with Phillips’s and Fry’s treat-
ment of Article 2(c) of the UCMJ. According to Randall:
[t]he recent decision in United States v. Fry raises the question as 
to whether the. . .interpretation of the broad language found in 
Article 2(c) would cover a National Guard Soldier serving in a full-
time National Guard status under Title 32. . .Applying the analysis 
developed in United States v. Phillips regarding Article 2(c), the 
UCMJ would apply to the Texas National Guard AGR serving [at a 
military school] under Title 32.37
Randall explains that the preliminary issue in applying Article 
2(c) of the UCMJ is whether the accused was serving with an 
armed force. Looking to Phillips’ interpretation of what it means to 
serve with an armed force, a colorable argument can be made that 
Randall’s hypothetical Texas National Guard soldier fits that mold.  
“Once this threshold question is satisfied,” Randall writes, “the 
four-prong analysis set forth in Article 2(c) applies.”38 And, apply-
ing Article 2(c)’s four-prong test, Randall concludes that the infe-
rior officer’s service clearly falls under the purview of Article 2(c), 
despite the fact that such service is in a Title 32 status.39
Overall, the takeaway from Randall’s argument is not that a Title 
32 duty National Guardsman definitively falls under the purview of 
Article 2 of the UCMJ, despite his forceful conclusion. It is that the 
decisions in Phillips and Fry provide a framework from which we 
could argue that Title 32 duty National Guardsmen can, and per-
35. Id. at 31.
36. Id. at 29. Though, as Randall notes, “there is no express prohibition in the UCMJ to 
such application when the Soldier is performing full time National Guard duty under Title 
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haps should, answer to Article 2 of the UCMJ. More importantly, 
Randall’s argument itself provides a sound starting point from 
which a more comprehensive reform can be developed—at least 
from the perspective of statutory interpretation. That said, we will 
return to Phillips, Fry, and Randall’s argument later. Before we are 
able to explore the consequences these cases may have on the fed-
eral duty status of a National Guardsman under Title 32, we should 
first to turn to other cases with very real effects on the UCMJ’s sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.
3.  The Solorio Standard
The most significant case in Article 2 jurisprudence is the Su-
preme Court’s 1987 decision in Solorio v. United States.40 Richard 
Solorio was enlisted in the Coast Guard when he was charged un-
der the UCMJ with acts of sexual abuse with the underage daugh-
ters of fellow Coast Guardsmen.41 Solorio committed some of these 
acts at his private residence—not on-base.42 While the military 
judge “granted Solorio’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction those offenses that occurred off-base,” the Court 
ruled that Solorio could in fact be tried by court-martial because 
he committed the crimes—either civilian or service-based—while 
on active duty status.43
Prior to Solorio, the controlling decision affecting the UCMJ’s
subject matter jurisdiction was O’Callahan v. Parker.44 There, the 
disposition of the Court reflected the language of its observation in 
Reid v. Covert that “every extension of military jurisdiction is an en-
croachment on the jurisdiction of the civilian courts, and, more 
important, acts as a deprivation of the right to jury trial and other 
treasured constitutional protections.”45 The Court held that court-
martial jurisdiction was limited to crimes that are service-
connected—thus limiting the scope of the UCMJ’s subject matter 
jurisdiction that had been in effect for over fifty years.46
40. 483 U.S. 435.
41. Id. at 437.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 450–51; see also Pottorff, Jr., supra note 24, at 29, 32.
44. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
45. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 21 (1957) (cited with approval in O’Callahan, 395 U.S. at 
272).
46. O’Callahan, 395 U.S. at 272; see also Fred K. Morrison, Court-Marital Jurisdiction: The 
Effect of O’Callahan v. Parker, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 508 (1969). A driving theory behind 
the Court’s decision in O’Callahan v Parker was a concern with preserving the constitutional 
rights of the accused—being that “civilian courts, in time of peace, with their rights to jury 
trials, and other safeguards, can and should handle” all non-military related offenses. See id. 
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Holding that the standard for court-martial jurisdiction under 
Article 2 of the UCMJ “depends solely on the accused’s status as a 
member of the Armed Forces, and not on the ‘service connection’
of the offense charged,”47 the Court in Solorio finally returned ju-
risdiction to the UCMJ, giving prosecutors the power to try offens-
es committed by members of the Armed Forces off-base.48
But what does “status as a member of the Armed Forces” mean 
for reserve and National Guard members? Solorio does not provide 
a clear answer. Fortunately, a line of cases interpreting Solorio pro-
vide some contour to an otherwise amorphous doctrine.
The first of these cases, United States v. Chodara, makes it clear 
that the offense must have been committed while the reservist was 
on active duty.49 Following closely on Chodara’s heels, United States 
v. Cline holds that jurisdiction attaches at 00:01 hours (12:01 A.M.) 
of the effective date of the orders to active duty.50 And as we saw 
with Phillips, a reservist may be under the purview of Article 2 out-
side the parameters of her orders—if Article 2’s four part test is sat-
isfied (the person is serving with an armed force and “(1) submit-
ted voluntarily to military authority; (2) met the minimum age and 
mental qualifications; (3) received pay and allowances; and (4) 
performed military duties . . . .”).51
Gray areas still exist, however. United States v. Morse holds that of-
fenses committed as part of the accused’s official duties may be sub-
ject to court-martial jurisdiction even when the accused is no long-
er on active duty.52 There, a reservist falsified travel vouchers after 
completing travel for an active duty tour.53 The court found that 
even though the reservist’s active duty travel was complete, his ac-
tive duty tour was not complete until the travel forms were 
at 512 (citing NAT’L SEC. DIV., AM. LEGION, REPORT ON THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY 
JUSTICE). “The effect of the Court’s decision,” Morrison writes, “was that a court-martial has 
no jurisdiction that to try a member of the armed forces charged with a crime cognizable in 
a civilian court and not ‘service-connected,’ committed while on leave, during peacetime, 
off-post, within the territorial limits of the United States.” Id. at 513.
47. Solorio, 483 U.S. at 435.
48. See Pottorff, Jr., supra note 24, at 29.
49. 29 M.J. 943 (A.C.M.R. 1990); see also Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Reservists/National 
Guard, GONZALEZ & WADDINGTON, http://www.ucmjdefense.com/resources/military-
extraterritorial-jurisdiction-act-meja/jurisdiction-over-the-offense/subject-matter-
jurisdiction-over-reservistsnational-guard.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2018).
50. 29 M.J. 83 (C.M.A. 1989); see also Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Reservists/National 
Guard, supra note 49.
51. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Reservists/National Guard, supra note 49 (citing United 
States v. Phillips, 58 M.J. 217 (C.A.A.F. 2003)).
52. No. ACM 33566, 2000 WL 1663459 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 4, 2000); see also Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction Over Reservists/National Guard, supra note 49.
53. Morse, 2000 WL 1663459, at *1.
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signed—so Article 2 still attached to his conduct.54 Perhaps even 
more interesting for our purposes is United States v. Dimuccio, which 
holds that a National Guard superior officer performing Title 32 
duties has no jurisdiction over an inferior officer, if that inferior 
officer is performing Title 10 duties.55
Independent of the doctrine’s lack of clarity, Solorio presents a 
number of constitutional concerns—the same ones that fueled the 
decision under O’Callahan. Military courts are courts of limited ju-
risdiction.56 They afford defendants neither Fifth Amendment 
grand jury indictment nor Sixth Amendment jury trial protec-
tions.57 So, does Solario do a constitutional disservice to service 
members that commit civilian crimes? The Solorio majority appar-
ently did not think so. Title 10 mandates that service members are 
entitled to (1) preliminary investigations, (2) the right to examine 
the government’s evidence and witnesses, and (3) a court-martial 
panel of at least three when the possible sentence will not exceed 
six months and a jury of at least five when the sentence is greater 
than six months.58
Whether these protections actually preserve the constitutional 
rights of military defendants who commit civilian crimes is up for 
debate. We will revisit these concerns with an eye towards expand-
ing Article 2’s subject matter jurisdiction—especially in light of a 
military that is both transitioning from reliance on active duty 
forces to reserve and National Guard components59—and, as of 
2016, incorporating women into all available combat roles.60
54. Id. at *5; see also Jurisdiction Over the Reserve Component, GONZALEZ & WADDINGTON,
http://www.ucmjdefense.com/resources/military-extraterritorial-jurisdiction-act-meja/
jurisdiction-over-the-reserve-component.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2018).
55. 61 M.J. 588 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2005); see also Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Reserv-
ists/National Guard, supra note 49. Note: this is the converse of the situation offered by T. 
Scott Randall, who argued that a Title 32 inferior officer could be held liable for disrespect-
ful conduct towards a Title 10 superior officer where the Title 32 soldier satisfies Article 2’s
four-part test. See Randall, supra note 25, at 31.
56. See, e.g., Pottorff, supra note 24, at 30.
57. Id.
58. 10 U.S.C. §§ 831–835 (2018); id. § 816.
59. See Mark Thompson, No Strategic Reservation, TIME (Apr. 19, 2013), http://nation.
time.com/2013/04/19/verbal-attacks-on-strategic-reserve/ (“Ever since the post-9/11 wars 
put pressure on the U.S. Army for more troops, its reserve forces have effectively become 
part of the operational Army, and not confined to their traditional role as a so called ‘strate-
gic reserve’ . . . . [T]he bottom line is striking: by making the reserves part of the operational 
forces to wage those wars, the nation essentially more than doubled the size of its operation-
al Army from 480,000 on 9/11 to 1.1 million today . . . . Now the reserves want to make that 
change permanent.”).
60. Women are eligible to apply for up to 220,000 open positions in the military, in-
cluding combat and elite units like the Army Rangers and Navy SEALs. This would more 
than double the number of women serving in the military, from 205,000 today. See Thom 
Patterson, Get Ready for More US Women in Combat, CNN (Nov. 16, 2016), http://www.cnn.
com/2016/11/10/us/women-combat-us-military/index.html.
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C. Setting the Stage for Change
The implications of Solorio’s “service member-status” holding are 
significant for two reasons: (1) America’s standing armed forces 
are transitioning to leaner, cheaper, and more flexible forces con-
sisting of reserve units,61 and (2) women are now eligible to serve 
in all combat roles.62 With these facts in mind, we can start to un-
ravel the issues at hand.
First, The Solorio case and its progeny suggest that Article 2 juris-
diction is triggered if an individual commits an offense while an ac-
tive member of the armed forces. What does it mean to be on ac-
tive duty? As we discussed earlier, this means different things for 
reservists and for National Guardsmen. Reservists are considered 
on active duty when operating under Title 10. And under Title 10, 
reservists may be considered active duty status when operating in 
his or her official active duty, whether an active duty tour has tech-
nically yet to start (Phillips) or whether it is technically at an end 
(Morse). So too can National Guardsmen be considered active duty 
status under Title 10. Whether they can be considered active duty 
status while operating under Title 32 is less clear. On the one 
hand, the Phillips, Fry, and Caputo cases seem to suggest that room 
for interpretation exists for whether Article 2 attaches to National 
Guardsmen so long as Article 2’s four-part test is satisfied. The 
Dimuccio case, however, shrinks that room for interpretation—at 
least, as it applies to circumstances in which a hypothetical Title 32 
Officer reprimands a Title 10 (lower) officer. And while Phillips,
Fry, and Caputo present interesting lessons in legal interpretation, 
they alone are not sufficient to support the reforms necessary to 
solve the problem at hand.
Second, the move towards incorporating more reserve units 
across all branches of the armed forces means that a greater pro-
portion of the military will consist of both reserve and National 
Guard members.
And third—because all combat roles are now open to women—
it is not unreasonable to expect a greater proportion of those re-
serve forces to consist of women than before.
Therefore, in order to protect female service members from en-
during the harassment and shame of the recent photo scandal 
(and all other crimes, broadly), two reforms should be explored: 
(1) comprehensive change in the UCMJ’s approach to punishing 
the distribution of illicit, personal photographs, and (2) compre-
61. See Thompson, supra note 59.
62. See Patterson, supra note 60.
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hensive change in Article 2 subject matter jurisdiction, allowing it 
to attach to National Guardsmen operating under Title 32 in cer-
tain circumstances. The first of these has already been addressed 
by policy makers, but it is worth revisiting. The second issue—
addressing the structural limitations of the UCMJ’s subject matter 
jurisdiction—is what this Note seeks to address.
II. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
When looking at the current state of law covering the noncon-
sensual distribution of illicit photographs, there are three broad 
categories to consider. First, there is the common law, as seen in 
Solorio and subsequent decisions that deal with the status of a 
member of the Armed Forces for the purpose of UCMJ Article 2 
subject matter jurisdiction. Second, there is the UCMJ itself. Third, 
there is civilian law, including both federal and state provisions.
We have already examined Solorio, its constitutional concerns, 
and its ramifications for Article 2 subject matter jurisdiction. It 
bears repeating that the Solorio standard is concerned with the ac-
cused’s status in the Armed Forces—and not with the service-
connected nexus of the crime previously established by 
O’Callahan.63 As a result, Solorio substantially expanded Article 2’s
subject matter jurisdiction. But, as we saw with the decisions that 
followed, what it means to be “a member of the Armed Forces” is 
an exceptionally narrow inquiry. As a practical matter, being a 
member of the Armed Forces means being on active duty, as it is 
understood in a traditional Title 10 context. So even though Solorio
has returned to courts martial a large degree of power, the ability 
to try reservists and national guardsmen not currently serving un-
der Title 10 duty is not part of that power.
There is another problem. Even if Solorio gave courts martial the 
power to try reservists and National Guardsmen accused of distrib-
uting illicit photographs, the UCMJ itself is ill-equipped to handle 
these cases. This is because the UCMJ currently constrains military 
prosecutors to two provisions when trying cases of nonconsensual 
distribution of illicit photographs: Article 120c and Article 134.64
Article 120c, entitled “Other Sexual Misconduct,” suffers from an 
issue of tailoring. Rather than addressing the nonconsensual dis-
tribution of private photos that initially are taken with consent, Ar-
ticle 120c only applies to knowingly photographing, videotaping, 
63. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 442–46 (1987) (overruling O’Callahan and 
rejecting its historical analysis).
64. 10 U.S.C. § 920c (2018); id. § 934.
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filming or recording by any means the private area of another per-
son, without that person’s consent.65
Article 134 suffers from a different problem: covering actions 
that prejudice good order and bring discredit to the service, it is 
actually broad enough to encapsulate the nonconsensual distribu-
tion of illicit photographs. But because of the novelty of the nude 
photo sharing issue (especially over social media) and the privacy 
concerns it presents (especially given the newly increased role of 
women in the military), this type of conduct has not been treated 
as a crime in the past.66 This is a problem for prosecutors, because 
nonconsensual distribution cases rely on fact-dependent evidence, 
rather than mere persuasion of a military judge.67 Without clear, 
relevant statutory language to point to and without precedent to 
rely on, prosecutors would be overwhelmed: scrambling to bring a 
number of these cases to justice.
Recognizing the shortfalls of the traditional protections of Arti-
cles 120c and 134 in sexual misconduct cases, and under intense 
pressure from Congress following the nude photo scandal, the De-
partment of the Navy introduced Article 1168, entitled “Noncon-
sensual Distribution or Broadcasting of an Image,” to its Code of 
Regulations.68 As its name suggests, Article 1168 makes the distri-
bution of intimate photos with the intent to humiliate or harass 
conduct worthy of administrative or punitive measures.69 But Arti-
cle 1168 applies only to the Navy, not to the other branches of the 
armed forces.
Civilian federal and state law does not provide military prosecu-
tors much recourse, either. 18 U.S.C. § 2261 bans interstate stalk-
ing, domestic violence, and harassment.70 But, like Article 120c and 
Article 134, this section of the U.S. Code is arguably either too nar-
row or too broad a provision to provide prosecutors with an ade-
quate basis to try these cases. Additionally, federal law would only 
be applicable where the crime crosses state lines—an additional el-
ement that military prosecutors largely lack the resources to prove.
Meanwhile, only thirty-four states currently have “revenge-porn”
laws (laws prohibiting the nonconsensual distribution of another’s
personal, illicit photographs) sufficient to adequately cover the 
65. Id. § 920c; see also Shane III & Schogol, supra note 1.
66. See Shane III & Schogol, supra note 1.
67. James Laporta & Rory Laverty, Why Marines Might Get Away with Sharing Nude Photos,
DAILY BEAST (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.thedailybeast.com/why-marines-might-get-away-
with-sharing-nude-photos.
68. Navy Updates Policy on Wrongful Distribution of Intimate Images, NAVY.MIL (May 16, 
2017, 11:34 AM), http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=100486.
69. Id.
70. Laporta & Laverty, supra note 67.
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nonconsensual distribution of illicit photographs here.71 Where 
there are no revenge-porn laws on the books, prosecutors are 
forced to try cases using laws against distributing obscene material, 
and trespassing.72 This is especially problematic when service 
members travel across state lines between civilian and active duty 
assignments. For example, North Carolina is home to Camp 
Lejeune—the largest Marine Corps base on the East Coast—and 
also treats revenge-porn as a felony.73 South Carolina, on the other 
hand, has no such law on the books.74 A Marine Corps reservist, 
therefore, could act with impunity in distributing illicit photo-
graphs of their sister-in-arms while living in South Carolina (or any 
other state unprepared or unwilling to prosecute those crimes) 
and escape punishment when serving on an active duty assignment 
in North Carolina. As long as the perpetrator committed the crime 
prior to active duty status, the UCMJ has no jurisdiction under Ar-
ticle 2.
Fortunately, there have been positive movements in both the 
UCMJ and civilian federal law in the months following the nude 
photo scandal. In April 2017, House Armed Services Committee 
member Jackie Speier (D-Calif.) noted the structural deficiencies 
in both Article 120c and Article 134 of the UCMJ, as well as the
lack of a comprehensive federal civilian statute to cover the non-
consensual distribution of illicit photos.75 “That is why,” Speier ex-
plained, “a federal law is needed to provide a single, clear articula-
tion of the elements of this crime to ensure that Americans in 
every part of the country—civilian and military—are protected if 
they are subjected to this heinous abuse.”76 The result of this call to 
action was that the “Protecting the Rights of Individuals Against 
Technological Exploitation Act”—the PRIVATE Act—was passed 
unanimously in the House in May 2017.77
The PRIVATE Act makes it a crime for service members to 
“knowingly and wrongfully” distribute or broadcast “an intimate 
visual image” of a person who is identifiable either by the image or 
comments about the image, and who has not given explicit consent 
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.5A (2015).
74. Laporta & Laverty, supra note 67.
75. Christina Marcos, House Passes Bill in Wake of Marine Nude-Photo Scandal, THE HILL
(May 24, 2017), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/334961-house-passes-bill-in-
response-to-marine-nude-photo-scandal.
76. Id.
77. Macagnone, supra note 14.
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for the image to be shared.78 Further, the PRIVATE Act states that 
anyone found in violation of the rules against nonconsensual dis-
tribution could be punished as directed by a court-martial, giving 
military prosecutors the necessary jurisdictional teeth to try these 
cases under the UCMJ.79 It also addresses the potentially fatal flaws 
of under/over-inclusiveness that characterize Articles 120c and 134 
by laying out specific elements of the crime to be charged and clar-
ifying the requisite intent.80 As of this writing, the bill still needs to 
pass the Senate and obtain the president’s signature before becom-
ing law.81
While the PRIVATE Act would be a major step towards filling 
the gaps in the UCMJ and federal statutory schemes as they pertain 
to the nonconsensual distribution of illicit photos, it would only 
solve half of the problem. The other half, as discussed earlier, is a 
structural limitation of the UCMJ itself, particularly Article 2. Arti-
cle 2, as influenced by the Solorio decision, limits the UCMJ’s sub-
ject matter jurisdiction to cover the conduct of service members 
engaged in active duty only.82 Reservists not operating under Title 
10 and National Guardsmen operating under Title 32 or civilian 
duty are not covered by the UCMJ83 (although we saw some room 
for interpretation regarding Title 32).84 Now that there is a chance 
that the PRIVATE Act will establish a specific statutory scheme for 
prosecuting nonconsensual distribution of illicit photos, action 
needs to be taken to address the fact that more of our military will 
(a) consist of reserve components and (b) consist of female service 
members. Specifically, Article 2 subject matter jurisdiction must 
expand to include service members, under contract with the 
armed forces, but not currently on active duty. Failure to do so 
would render the PRIVATE Act largely impotent, undermine the 
efforts of policy makers and activists to make our military safer and 
more effective, and put a substantial amount of our nation’s
fighting women at risk.
78. Daniella Silva, House Passes Bill to Ban Nonconsensual Nude Photo Sharing in Military,




81. See H.R. 2052-PRIVATE ACT, CONGRESS.GOV (May 25, 2017), https://www.congress.
gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/2052 (last visited Dec. 6, 2018) (indicating that the bill 
was referred to the Senate Committee on Armed Services on May 25, 2017, and no action 
has been taken since).
82. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 450–51 (1987).
83. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a) (2018); id. § 101(d)(1).
84. See Randall, supra note 25, at 31.
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III. REFORM
There are two conceivable solutions to this problem. First, courts 
could adopt an interpretation of Article 2(c)’s four-part test that 
would apply to both reservists operating under Title 10 duty and 
National Guardsmen operating under Title 32. This would bring a 
large swath of soldiers not currently covered by Article 2’s subject 
matter jurisdiction under the purview of the UCMJ, making them 
answerable to the provisions of PRIVATE. The second option in-
volves expanding—by congressional amendment—the subject mat-
ter jurisdiction of Article 2 to apply, under certain circumstances, 
to all reservists and Guardsmen currently serving out their con-
tracts, regardless of whether they are operating under Title 10 or 
32 duty.
First, as we saw in his hypothetical about a Title 32 National 
Guard officer being held liable under the UCMJ for disrespecting 
a superior Title 10 officer, T. Scott Randall believes that adopting a 
broader interpretation of Article 2’s four-part test is well within the 
realm of possibility.85 In coming to his conclusion, Randall looked 
primarily to United States v Fry. Randall observed that the Fry court 
“spent a considerable amount of time discussing the first clause of 
Article 2(c)” and whether its “broad language . . . would cover a 
National Guard Soldier serving in a full-time National Guard status 
under Title 32.”86 “The court’s analysis of the ‘[n]otwithstanding 
any other provision of law’ provision,” Randall notes, “was decisive
in reaching the conclusion that it was not bound by” state law.87
Randall further argues that the Fry court’s interpretation of the 
“ ‘notwithstanding’ clause was a clear expression of congressional 
intent that all state and federal law is preempted or superseded 
with respect to Article 2(c)” and that “this would presumably in-
clude any prohibition in applying the UCMJ to Title 32 Soldiers 
serving in a full-time National Guard status”—so long as Article 
2(c)’s four factors were fulfilled.88
Although such an interpretation is appealing for its clarity, there 
are some problems. The first is an issue of line drawing; if courts 
were to take such an expansive position on the interpretation of 




88. Id.; see also United States v. Phillips, 56 M.J. 843, 846 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2002) 
(“Article 2(c) extends jurisdiction to persons serving with an armed force who: (1) submit-
ted voluntarily to military authority; (2) met the mental competence and minimum age 
qualifications . . . ; (3) received military pay or allowances; and (4) performed military du-
ties.”), aff’d, 58 M.J. 217 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
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ation between Title 32 and Title 10 duty pointless. Any time a Na-
tional Guardsmen were called to Title 32 duty, for purposes of Ar-
ticle 2, he or she would be treated as if they were on active duty 
under Title 10. This brings up far more complex concerns of fed-
eralism, since National Guardsmen on Title 32 duty are under the 
control of the state, not the federal government. Practically speak-
ing, such an interpretation would not change the fact that the gov-
ernor maintains control over Title 32 Guardsmen.89 But then we 
are presented with the issue of a governor exercising commander 
in chief powers, while the soldiers utilized in that capacity are re-
moved from the state courts’ subject matter jurisdiction.
This would put governors in the difficult position of having to 
ask Title 32 Guardsmen to help faithfully execute the laws of the 
state—laws which would not protect the soldiers if they were 
charged with a crime during the course of their duty. Second, any 
time a Title 32 Guardsman were to commit a newsworthy crime 
against a civilian, there may be widespread frustration with the fact 
that it is a panel of military judges, and not a jury of the soldier’s
peers, deciding his or her fate. Worse still, this proposed remedy 
would do nothing to encourage the creation of a nonconsensual 
distribution statute at the state level, or indeed any other statutory 
reform aimed at addressing the dual trends of increased participa-
tion of reserve soldiers and women in our military. Because Title 
32 Guardsmen would be treated under the law as Title 10 reserv-
ists, it is not unreasonable to assume that the resource-strapped 
states would leave such reformatory matters to the federal govern-
ment. It is also not unreasonable to think that the states would 
choose not to enforce such provisions even if they were on the 
books—finding instead that the benefits of National Guard enlist-
ment outweigh vindication of the victims.
But the biggest problem with this idea—and most relevant for 
our purposes—is that such an interpretation of Article 2 only gets 
us seventy-five percent of the way to a comprehensive solution. Be-
cause if courts were to interpret Article 2(c)’s four-part test as ap-
plying to both reservists operating under Title 10 duty and Nation-
al Guardsmen operating under Title 32, presumably this would not 
include those soldiers who are currently serving their contract with 
the armed forces but not engaged in any sort of military duties. 
That is, all reservists and National Guardsmen not operating under 
Title 10 (or, as argued above, Title 32) would still not be covered 
by Article 2 of the UCMJ. That being the case, we are left with a 
UCMJ whose subject matter jurisdiction would cover more individ-
89. 32 U.S.C. § 328 (2018).
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uals than it currently does under the Solorio line of cases, but would 
not even cover the nonconsensual distribution of illicit photo-
graphs committed by many of the “Marines United” members. 
Such investigations and prosecutions would be left to the state, in-
stead, which, as we just discussed, likely would not occur even if the 
state had a nonconsensual distribution law on the books. The up-
shot here is that even with the potential benefits accompanying 
expanded UCMJ subject matter jurisdiction, we still largely end up 
in the same position where we started.
The second option for reform—a congressional amendment 
expanding the subject matter of Article 2—is not merely wishful 
thinking. In 1986, Congress amended Article 2 of the UCMJ to re-
flect the armed forces status-standard of the Solorio decision.90 The 
more difficult component of this reform would be the move away 
from Solorio’s bright line standard and determining both which 
crimes and circumstances should apply for purposes of Article 2 
subject matter jurisdiction. That is ultimately outside the scope of 
this Note. What this Note hopes to show, though, is that the foun-
dation for such a reform is sound, particularly as it pertains to the 
nonconsensual distribution of illicit photographs of fellow service
members. There are two reasons for this.
First, there are fewer concerns over the lack of Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment protections for part-time service members brought in-
to military court than full-time civilians. Like their active duty 
counterparts, Guardsmen and reservists alike are contracted mem-
bers of the armed forces. From a theoretical perspective, opening 
up part-time service members to liability under court-martial simp-
ly extends the logic of Solorio’s return to status-based subject matter 
jurisdiction from O’Callahan’s service-connected subject matter ju-
risdiction. Not only that, but service members are entitled by law to 
(1) preliminary investigations, (2) the right to examine the gov-
ernment’s evidence and witnesses, and (3) a court-martial panel of
at least three when the sentence will not exceed six months and a 
90. See MANUAL FOR THE COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES A21–10 (1987), 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/MCM_1984-change3.pdf (“1986 Amendment: 
[P]aragraph (5) was added to reflect amendments to Articles 2 and 3 of the UCMJ con-
tained in the ‘Military Justice Amendments of 1986,’ tit. VIII, § 804, National Defense Au-
thorization Act for fiscal year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661, ___Stat._____, _____ (1986), which, 
among other things, preserves the exercise of jurisdiction over reservists for offenses com-
mittee in a duty status, notwithstanding their release from duty status, if they have time re-
maining on their military obligation. The legislation also provides express statutory authori-
ty to order reservists, including members of the National Guard of the United States and the 
Air National Guard of the United States who commit offenses while serving on duty under 
Title 10 of the United States Code, to active duty for disciplinary action, including the ser-
vice of any punishment imposed.”).
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jury of at least five when the possible sentence is greater than six 
months, under Article 2 of the UCMJ.91
Practically speaking, the men and women of the reserve compo-
nents do not cease to be soldiers just because they are not de-
ployed or serving on active duty status under Title 10. Not only do 
they represent their respective branches, whether deployed or 
stateside, for the entirety of their contract (some would say that 
they represent their branch for the rest of their lives), but more to 
the point, their conduct reflects upon each of their brothers and 
sisters in arms. And it was exactly this distribution of accountability 
that made the 2017 nude photo scandal so stomach-churning for 
so many members of the armed forces.92 Accordingly, there is 
strong extralegal support for the argument that reservists should 
be held to the same standards as their active duty brethren for the 
specific crimes enumerated under the UCMJ.
There are, of course, complicated legal and political issues asso-
ciated with this position, some of which were enumerated earlier in 
this section. The biggest issue here is the idea of depriving reserv-
ists of their civilian status once they sign their contract, totally re-
moving their recourse to civilian laws and protections. But that is
not what this position presupposes. Instead, under these circum-
stances, the UCMJ would only be expanded to include (1) discrete 
crimes (such as consensual distribution of illicit photographs); (2) 
occurring under certain circumstances (when those photographs 
are of a fellow soldier currently serving out his or her contract); 
(3) that are of significance towards serving out a military contract 
with honor; and (4) may otherwise go unpunished in civilian 
courts. Any crimes not specifically enumerated under the UCMJ 
would remain outside military jurisdiction. Whether additional acts 
of misconduct should fit the criteria above and be included in the 
UCMJ would be a decision left to Congress. For illustrative purpos-
es, however, a list might include both non-physical acts of domestic 
violence or abuse between amorous service members and non-
sexual harassment of a fellow service member that rises to the level 
of requiring a protective order.
91. 10 U.S.C. §§ 831–835 (2018); id. § 816.
92. See, e.g., US Marines Get Social Media Tips After Nude Photos Scandal, BBC (Mar. 20, 
2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-39326669 (quoting Marine General Robert 
Neller as saying that “Marines . . . must avoid actions online that threaten the morale, opera-
tional readiness and security, or public standing of their units, or that compromise our core 
values . . . .”); Lawmakers Decry Degrading Marine Corps Nude Photo Scandal, CBS NEWS (Mar. 6, 
2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/marine-corps-rocked-by-nude-photo-scandal (quot-
ing Marine Corps Sergeant Major Ronald L. Green as saying that “[N]o person should be 
treated this way. [Nonconsensual distribution of illicit photographs] is inconsistent with our 
core values, and it impedes our ability to perform our mission.”).
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Second, and related to the concern over lack of Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment protections, is the concern that such an amendment 
might overwhelm military courts. Dealing with a far greater case 
load than they could handle, the worry is that military courts would 
pass the costs to the defendants in the form of hasty trials and 
harsh sentences.  But not all crimes must be punishable by courts 
martial, and not all crimes should warrant harsh sentences. The 
Manual for Courts-Martial empowers commanding officers to ren-
der administrative punishments for minor offenses without resort-
ing to a court-martial.93 Specifically, the Manual enables command-
ing officers to investigate the facts of the incident, make a 
determination as to whether the offense is minor (and thus not re-
quiring a court-martial), and conduct a hearing for the accused.94
In the case of nonconsensual distribution, therefore, administra-
tive punishment might be an appropriate response for first-time 
offenders. Administrative punishments in this instance could, for 
example, range from reassignment to a different unit, to a change 
in one’s occupation specialty, to a demotion of rank altogether. 
And because administrative punishment does not infringe upon 
the defendant’s liberty interests, we have less cause to worry about 
their diminished Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections. Not only 
that, but because administrative hearings are extralegal in nature 
and can be conducted outside of a military court room, we do not 
have to worry about overloading the courts martial system in the 
process of adjudicating acts of misconduct such as nonconsensual 
distribution of illicit photographs.
CONCLUSION
In the end, whether this particular reform is the best of all pos-
sible solutions is not of the utmost importance; it is one of many 
potential solutions. Rather, the purpose of this Note is to call at-
tention to the problem itself and foster debate about how we want 
to proceed as a nation. Our military is not only among the highest 
regarded and most trusted institutions in America, but it is one of 
the most visible ways we present ourselves to the world. As we in-
creasingly turn to our reserve forces to help maintain our com-
mitments world-wide, and as our reserve forces increasingly turn to 
women to play a larger role in that mission, it is critical that we 
93. See JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED 
STATES V 1(d)(3)(e) (2016), https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/Documents/MCM2016.
pdf?ver=2016-12-08-181411-957.
94. Id.
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take every effort to protect our warrior women while they risk their 
lives to protect us.
